Facts[ edit ] The case involved two parties in the sale of wool. On 2 September, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs offering to sell them certain fleeces of wool and requiring an answer in the course of post. The defendants misdirected the letter so that the plaintiffs did not receive it until 5 September. Meanwhile , on 8 September, the defendants, not having received an answer by 7 September as they had expected, sold the wool to someone else. The defendants argued that there could not be a binding contract until the answer was actually received, and until then they were free to sell the wool to another buyer. Then when the Offeree has placed his acceptance in the post there is a meeting of minds, which concludes the offer and gives effect to the acceptance.
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You are on page 1of 5 Search inside document Adams v Lindsell Facts The case involved two parties in the sale of wool.
On 2 September, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs offering to sell them certain fleeces of wool and requiring an answer in the course of post. The defendants misdirected the letter so that the plaintiffs did not receive it until 5 September.
Meanwhile, on 8 September, the defendants, not having received an answer by 7 September as they had expected, sold the wool to someone else. The defendants argued that there could not be a binding contract until the answer was actually received, and until then they were free to sell the wool to another buyer.
Then when the Offeree has placed his acceptance in the post there is a fictional meeting of minds, which concludes the offer and gives effect to the acceptance. But because the delay was the default of the defendant it was taken that the acceptance did arrive in course of post. Barry v Davies Facts The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction the goods had no reserve price when a bona fide bid of was effective. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficient consideration.
The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has a collateral agreement with the auctioneer. Judgment: The remedy is the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under the Sale of Goods Act s51 3. The value in this case was 27, Long v Lloyd Facts Lloyd advertised a lorry as being in exceptional condition.
Mr Lloyd then said it could do 40 mph. On a trial run from Hampton Court to Sevenoaks, he said it did 11 miles to the gallon. Mr Long bought it for Two days later, driving to Rochester and back the dynamo stopped working, the oil seal was defective, there was a crack in the wheel and it did only five miles to the gallon.
Mr Lloyd then said he would repair for half price of a reconstructed dynamo. Mr Long accepted. Then on another journey, being used by his brother on a business trip to Middlesbrough, it broke down.
Mr Long sued to rescind. Judgment Pearce LJ held that the contract had been affirmed when it was taken back after having been fixed.
He emphasised that Mr Long chose not to have an expert examine the lorry. On fuel consumption he had a reasonable time to test it, so on any view he must have accepted the lorry before he purported to reject it. Hartley v Ponsonby Facts Hartley was contracted to crew a ship owned by Ponsonby. After docking, seventeen of the thirty-six man crew deserted, and only six of the remaining men were competent seamen. When the ship arrived at the home port, Ponsonby refused to pay the crewmen the extra wages he had promised.
The desertion of so many crewmen compared to the desertion of two crewmen in Stilk v Myrick changed the nature of the remaining sailors duties to the point where the contract could be considered discharged. As such the offer by Ponsonby to pay the crew to sail back and the acceptance by the crew could be considered an entirely new contract, providing valid consideration.
Beer agreed that she would not take any action against Foakes for the amount owed if he would sign an agreement promising to pay an initial sum of 52, Foakes was in financial difficulty and, with the help of his solicitor, drew up an agreement for Beer to waive any interest on the amount owed. She signed. Foakes paid back the principal but not the interest. Then Beer sued Foakes for the interest. The question was whether she was entitled to it, despite their agreement that he would not need to pay it.
Watkin Williams J upheld this decision, given the agreement between the two. That stipulation renders the document available as a security. Upon the authority of the decisions, I think there was abundant consideration for the agreement. Court of Appeal On appeal, in a short judgment Brett MR instead held for Beer because there was no consideration for the agreement. He had been awarded the Cross of Saint-Louis during the reign of Louis XV in recognition of his service in the Dragoons and his diplomatic work.
In the reign of Louis XV, the king established a spy service which was known as the Secret. During his time in England he fell out of favour with two of the kings ministers a dispute having started over the level of his expenses , leading to his replacement by another diplomat, but he continued to serve his country as a spy and therefore reported indirectly to the king.
He held concerns that if he were to return to France he could have been imprisoned on the Bastille. Over time he made comments which threw doubt on his true sex. Being well known in London comments about his sex became the subject of talk and comment in the press.
In turn this led to numerous wagering contracts being entered into. The wager in the Da Costa v Jones was not the first to have come before the courts.
It was not until this case that the Court Lord Mansfield considered the public policy issues arising from this form of wager. Judgment Lord Mansfield held the contract was ineffective, on the basis that it was not in good faith.
Paragons rate of interest was variable at its discretion. The Bank of England lowered its interest rate. Paragon did not pass on the lower rate. Nash claimed that they were being made to pay substantially over the market rate of interest for secured loans, and were unable to find another lender because they had fallen into arrears. Judgment Dyson LJ held that the power to vary the interest rate at its discretion had to be exercised in a rational and honest way. This implied term was necessary in order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties.
It was not grossly exorbitant. Nor was the term unfair under UCTA section 3 2 b i , because part of the contractual performance was the discretion and its exercise was what could be reasonably expected.
Thorpe LJ and Astill J concurred. During negotiations Mr Walker sent enquiries to Mr Boyle asking, Is the vendor aware of any disputes regarding the boundaries, easements, covenants or other matters relating to the property or its use? Mrs Boyle asked her husband who answered no. But really there had been a long running dispute with the neighbour, which Mr Boyle incorrectly thought had been settled. Condition 17 1 of the contract which incorporated the National Conditions of Sale said that, no error, misstatement or omission in any preliminary answer concerning the property shall annul the sale.
Mr Walker brought an action for rescission based on misrepresentation. The question was whether Mr and Mrs Boyle could rely on the exclusion clause and whether it was reasonable under MA s 3. Judgment Dillon J held the condition fell foul of s 3 MA Neither parties solicitors directed their minds to condition 17, so it was not one which ought reasonably to have been known to or in the contemplation of the parties.
He added that the National Conditions of Sale, though common, were not the product of negotiations between interested trade parties. Related Interests.
Adams v Lindsell 
Adams v Lindsell